Magnificent Delusions

September 9, 2013
Mistrust and cross-purposes characterize relations between Pakistan and the U.S., writes Haqqani, Pakistan’s ambassador to the U.S from 2008 to 2011 and now a Boston University professor, in this insightful if disturbing history. During the bloodshed of 1947, India’s forces drove Pakistan from Kashmir, a Muslim majority region that, theoretically, belonged to Muslim Pakistan. Obsession over Kashmir’s loss persists, creating a “virtual permanent war with India”; civil government remains subservient to the military, which absorbs most of Pakistan’s revenue, leaving little for economic development. Pakistani leaders quickly requested U.S aid, trumpeting their anticommunism. America responded modestly but generously after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and massively after 9/11. Pakistan spends the bulk of its resources facing India—American leaders accept this as the price of cooperation but gnash their teeth over Pakistan’s tepid enthusiasm for our war on terror. Pakistan’s generals have no love for al-Qaeda but have long supported the Afghan Taliban and would prefer them to the present government. Making it clear why he is persona non grata in his homeland, Haqqani concludes that military aid has undermined Pakistan’s democracy, converting it into a rentier state living off American money rather than its people’s productivity. Agent: the Wylie Agency.

October 15, 2013

The United States and Pakistan are often described as allies and partners. But, as Haqqani (international relations, Boston Univ.), former Pakistani ambassador to the United States, makes clear, the U.S.-Pakistani alliance over the past six decades has been a mirage that is in need of redefinition and mutual acknowledgment of divergent interests. Haqqani uses his wealth of personal experience to present a detailed account of the genesis and evolution of U.S.-Pakistani relations over the last 60 years. As he clearly demonstrates, Pakistan's geopolitical alliance with the United States has been predicated on using U.S. aid to confront India's influence and hegemony in the region. For the United States, however, these are not and never have been overriding concerns. Washington's interests in Pakistan were initially driven by the Cold War realities of the 1950s and 1960s, by the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, and by the war on terror. In other words, this alliance of convenience has not been based on shared values or on the same regional geostrategic interests. VERDICT The book is a useful resource for academics, journalists, and policymakers at all levels.--Nader Entessar, Univ. of South Alabama, Mobile

Copyright 2013 Library Journal, LLC Used with permission.

Starred review from October 15, 2013
Pakistan never pulled itself together after its bloody creation from British India in 1947, asserts Haqqani (International Relations/Boston Univ.; Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, 2005, etc.), former ambassador to the United States, in this insightful, painful history of Pakistani-American relations. Cobbling together a government (India received the capital and most civil servants) after independence, Pakistan's leaders remain preoccupied with India, a fixation aggravated by losing several wars and the secession of East Pakistan as Bangladesh. The military absorbed the lion's share of the budget, and when generals were not governing, civilian leaders deferred to their wishes. The economic development has been comparable to that of sub-Saharan Africa. Pakistan received modest aid until the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when America funneled massive support for the mujahedeen through Pakistan's army, which remained influential in the anarchy after the Soviet withdrawal, sponsoring radical Islamic forces including the Taliban. Pakistan considers a fiercely Islamic Afghan government essential to exclude Indian influence. After 9/11, Pakistan agreed to support America's war on terror. This was risky since the average Pakistani prefers terrorists to Americans, but we made an offer it couldn't refuse: an avalanche of aid. American leaders knew Pakistan would spend most on conventional forces facing India but hoped for a quid pro quo. The result has been some cooperation against international terrorism but none against the Afghan Taliban--which, the author reminds us, are not international terrorists. America's increasing frustration is matched by Pakistani outrage at military and drone incursions, which have produced violent anti-Americanism that threatens to destabilize a government that has never been noticeably stable. Demonstrating no mercy to either party, Haqqani admits that Pakistan verges on failed-state status but shows little patience with America's persistently shortsighted, fruitless policies.

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